

Data Markets for Energy Forecasting

Pierre Pinson

Imperial College London, Dyson School of Design Engineering

mail: p.pinson@imperial.ac.uk - **webpage:** www.pierrepinson.com

IEEE SmartGridComm 2022

27 October 2022

(Ackn. to collaborators: C. Goncalves, R. Bessa, L. Han, J Kazempour -

Partly funded by EU project Smart4RES)

- ① The context and a motivating example
- ② Collaborative and market-based analytics platforms
- ③ Regression market example
- ④ Concluding thoughts and discussion

- 1 The context and a motivating example processes

Today, everything has to be smart!



etc.

Smart Energy

Smart Cities

Industry 4.0

Smart Transport

Smart Agriculture

“Smart”
=
Data
+
Analytics

1995/2005 – ...



- Data collection is increasing at an astounding rate (order of billions of GB per day!)
- This motivated research efforts towards **big data** analytics



- Data collection and storage is decentralized
- This led to a focus on **edge**, **cloud** and **fog computing**

1995/2005 – ...



- Data collection is increasing at an astounding rate (order of billions of GB per day!)
- This motivated research efforts towards **big data** analytics



- Data collection and storage is decentralized
- This led to a focus on **edge**, **cloud** and **fog computing**



Remaining
gap:

Data ownership is also **distributed**, with agents having **heterogeneous preferences** (privacy, competition, willingness to share, etc.)

1995/2005 – ...



- Data collection is increasing at an astounding rate (order of billions of GB per day!)
- This motivated research efforts towards **big data** analytics



- Data collection and storage is decentralized
- This led to a focus on **edge**, **cloud** and **fog computing**




Proposal
solution:

Collaborative and market-based analytics!

(or, how can we design systems and mechanisms that allow to get the full value from distributed data)


Context:

- Wind farms offer in electricity markets based on their individual (probabilistic) forecasts and private information
- Their revenue is affected by their (lack of) forecast accuracy




Opportunity: All *could* benefit from some form of collaboration (e.g., information sharing)

Challenge: They have no interest in doing so




Proposal: Design a framework allowing for all agents to collaborate and benefit from it




2 Collaborative and market-based analytics platforms

Agents meet through **analytics platforms** supporting collaborative and market-based analytics


Collaborative Analytics:



Data Markets:



Analytics Markets:



(computing interaction data exchange payment)

Substantial **methodological research** is needed to design such analytics platforms! (e.g., blending mechanism design, statistical/machine learning, UX/UI, behavioral economics and science, etc.)

Another angle: Prediction markets



Prediction markets have been around for quite a while now...


- simply put, you get a number N of agents to bet on a specific outcome (their forecasts for the “event”)
- you use N forecasts to produce a final forecast
- agents are monetarily rewarded for their contribution

There has been many interesting applications, e.g.

- Iowa electronic markets (iem.uiowa.edu)
- numer.ai
- blockchain-based applications... (e.g., Augur)

A proposal wagering mechanism

The client has a **forecast report** r_c (and a utility function $U(r_c, \hat{r}, \phi, y)$), can others help in improving it?



- Y is the event the client is interested in, y is the observation
- (r_i, m_i) are the forecast report and wager for agent i

③ Regression market example

P. Pinson, L. Han, J. Kazempour (2022) Regression markets and application to energy forecasting. *TOP*, available online ([pdf](#))

The central agent and the regression problem

- Consider a *central agent* (“**Forecaster**”) with a regression problem, e.g., as a basis to forecast renewable power generation for a given site (y_{t+k})
- Forecaster** owns a set ω of m features, $\omega = \{x_1, \dots, x_m\}$

The following regression problem could be used as basis for eventual prediction,

$$Y_{t+k} = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \beta_i x_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t, \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$

The vector of parameters $\beta = [\beta_0 \dots \beta_m]^\top$ can easily be learned by minimizing an appropriate loss function

$$\hat{\beta} = \underset{\beta}{\operatorname{argmin}} S_{\omega}(\beta), \quad S_{\omega}(\beta) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \rho \left(y_{t+k} - \left(\beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \beta_i x_{i,t} \right) \right)$$

where ρ may be any convex loss function (e.g., quadratic, pinball loss, etc.)

Based on the data available, the minimum loss function value is $S_{\omega}^* = S_{\omega}(\hat{\beta})$

- Forecaster** could post the regression task on an analytics platform, to improve model fit
- Forecaster** declares a willingness to pay of $\phi = 1\text{€}$ per percent-point improvement in S and per data point provided.

- Two *support agents* **Good Data** and **Useful Features** may bring in additional features z_1 and z_2 , to be remunerated
- The overall set of features now is $\Omega = \omega \cup \{z_1, z_2\}$

The regression problem can then be augmented, as

$$Y_{t+k} = \underbrace{\beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \beta_i x_{i,t}}_{\text{Forecaster}} + \underbrace{\gamma_1 z_{1,t}}_{\text{Good Data}} + \underbrace{\gamma_2 z_{2,t}}_{\text{Useful Features}} + \varepsilon_t, \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$

where the augmented vector of coefficients $\beta^+ = [\beta_0 \dots \beta_m \gamma_1 \gamma_2]^\top$ can be learned similarly, by minimizing an appropriately chosen convex loss function ρ , i.e.,

$$\hat{\beta}^+ = \underset{\beta^+}{\operatorname{argmin}} S_\Omega(\beta^+), \quad S_\Omega(\beta^+) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \rho \left(y_{t+k} - \left(\beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m \beta_i x_{i,t} + \gamma_1 z_{1,t} + \gamma_2 z_{2,t} \right) \right)$$

We eventually write $S_\Omega^* = S_\Omega(\hat{\beta}^+)$

- If z_1 and/or z_2 are informative features, one expects $S_\Omega^* < S_\omega^*$

- How to define **revenues** and **payments** in such a regression market?

For each support agent j ($j = 1, 2$), the revenue is given by

$$\pi_j = (S_\omega^* - S_\Omega^*) T \phi \psi_j, \quad j = 1, 2$$

where ψ_j is an allocation policy based on feature valuation (can be obtained with, e.g., leave-one-out or Shapley-based allocation), such that $\sum_j \psi_j = 1$

For **Forecaster**, the payment is

$$\pi_c = \phi(S_\omega^* - S_\Omega^*) T$$

Such a simple approach actually yields a market with a wealth of good properties, i.e.,

- budget balance
- symmetry (or anonymity)
- zero element
- incentive compatibility
- individual rationality (truthfulness)

In-sample and out-of-sample

Typically,

- we learn in-sample (batch or online)
- we predict out-of-sample...

Can we use the above concepts more generally?

In-sample and out-of-sample

Typically,

- we learn in-sample (batch or online)
- we predict out-of-sample...

Can we use the above concepts more generally?

In **online regression** markets, the payments can be generalized with

$$\pi_{j,t} = (S_{\omega,t}^* - S_{\Omega,t}^*) \phi \psi_{j,t}, \quad j = 1, 2$$

where $S_{\omega,t}^*$ and $S_{\Omega,t}^*$ are time-varying estimator of the loss function, and $\psi_{j,t}$ is a time-varying estimate of allocation policies (profiting of their linearity property)

And, in **out-of-sample regression** markets (i.e., for genuine forecasting),

$$\pi_{j,t} = (s_{\omega,t}^* - s_{\Omega,t}^*) \phi \psi_{j,t}, \quad j = 1, 2$$


where $s_{\omega,t}^*$ and $s_{\Omega,t}^*$ are time-varying estimator of the loss function, and $\psi_{j,t}$ is the instantaneous allocation policies (i.e., readily Shapley additive explanation)

Batch, online, and out-of-sample regression markets all enjoy the same properties.

(given convex loss functions and models that are linear in their parameters)

A real world case study in South Carolina (USA)

Wind power generation for 9 locations in South Carolina (US) – 7 years of data with hourly resolution




Agent	P_n [MW]	Lat./Long.	County
a_1	1.75	34.248/-79.75	Florence
a_2	2.96	34.02/-79.537	Florence
a_3	3.38	33.925/-79.958	Florence
a_4	16.11	34.732/-82.122	Laurens
a_5	37.98	34.556/-81.889	Laurens
a_6	30.06	34.334/-82.133	Laurens
a_7	2.53	33.136/-80.857	Colleton
a_7	2.6	33.112/-80.665	Colleton
a_9	1.24	32.641/-80.504	Colleton

1-hour ahead forecasting based on $Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \sum_{\delta=1}^{\Delta} y_{i,t-\delta} + \sum_{j \neq i} \sum_{\delta=1}^{\Delta} y_{j,t-\delta} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$


where a_i is the central agent and a_j ($j \neq i$) are the support agents

- Online quantile regression ($\tau = 0.55$) in models with 2 lags for a_i and 1 lag for a_j ($j \neq i$)
- $\phi = 0.2\$$ in-sample, and $\phi = 0.8\$$ out-of-sample (per unit loss, per data point)

Cumulative payments of a_6 towards others:




(a) Online regression market.




(b) Out-of-sample regression market.

Let's see what happens if they all pay each other for data to improve forecasts...



(a) Online regression market.



(b) Out-of-sample regression market.

● Concluding thoughts and discussion

Collaborative and market-based analytics have a bright future...

- need for many methodological developments
- and focus on relevant business cases and models

In the broader picture, privacy, competition and ethics eventually kick in...!

Thanks for your attention!

- ❶ P. Pinson, L. Han, J. Kazempour (2022) Regression markets and application to energy forecasting. *TOP* **30**: 533–573 ([pdf](#))
- ❷ L. Han, P. Pinson, J. Kazempour (2022) Trading data for wind power forecasting: A regression market with Lasso regularization. Proc. of the Power System Computation (PSCC) conference 2022, Porto, Portugal ([arxiv.org/pdf/2110.07432](#))
- ❸ C. Goncalves, P. Pinson, R. Bessa (2020) Towards data markets in renewable energy forecasting. *IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy* **12**(1): 533-542 ([pdf](#))
- ❹ A. M. Kharman, C. Jursitzky, Q. Zhao, P. Ferraro, J. Marecek, P. Pinson, R. Shorten (2022) On the design of decentralised data markets. Preprint, under review ([arxiv.org/abs/2206.06299](#))
- ❺ S. R. Pandey, P. Pinson, P. Popovski (2022) Participation and data valuation in IoT data markets through distributed coalitions. Preprint, under review ([arxiv.org/abs/2206.07785](#))

... among many other papers appearing lately about data markets!